From the Author.

NOW, OR NEVER:

OR,

BRITAIN's PEACE

IN HER

OWN POWER.

6.

" AN EGO, CUM OMNES CALEANT, IGNAVITER
" ALIQUID FACIAM?"

CICERO.

London:

PRINTED FOR J. HATCHARD,
NO. 173,
OPPOSITE BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.
1798.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

NOW, OR NEVER.

THE actual ſtate of the war, in which we are now on the eve of cloſing the preſent year, and of entering upon the next, muſt fix the thoughts of every Briton in amazement, and animate his heart with the moſt glowing gratitude. The ſudden and aſtoniſhing change which has taken effect in the relative ſituation of every nation in Europe—not only of thoſe that are immediately engaged in the war, or that maintain an eutrality in the conteſt, but even of thoſe that are ſtill bleeding and groaning under the tyranny and perfidy of France;—this ſudden change, brought about by ONE UNEXAMPLED VICTORY, has diſpelled the gloom which has been growing for ſome years over Europe—has arreſted the progreſs of the ſtorm—and has cauſed a brilliancy of light to break forth, and diffuſe itſelf, once more, over the face of the Chriſtian world.

This victory, of which the arms of Great Britain have been made the favoured inſtruments, appears to be becomingly received by the whole nation;

and to have impreſſed them with this moſt important and awful conviction—that "*It was not* THEIR OWN *ſword nor* THEIR OWN *arm that ſaved them*—but that HIS *right hand and* HIS *holy arm hath gotten* HIM *the victory,—who is* GOVERNOR AMONG THE NATIONS—*and who ruleth by* HIS POWER *for ever.*"

It is impoſſible to take even a ſummary view of the particular circumſtances attending our late deliverances, or to obſerve the extraordinary coincidences which diſtinguiſh them, without becoming more and more ſenſible of THE CAUSE to which we originally owe them.—The progreſs of miſchief had been ſuffered to make a gradual advance towards a point, which it now appears, it was *not to exceed*;—every meaſure that a malignant envy and an infernal vengeance could deviſe, ſeemed on the eve of accompliſhment;—The enemy had found the means of reaching, almoſt at the ſame moment, two principal vitals of the Britiſh Empire;—His hand was already raiſed to ſtrike with force upon IRELAND and INDIA—when the arm was ſuddenly checked and paralized; and the blow deſigned for our demolition, fell with unexampled fury and confuſion upon his own head. Deliverances ſo diſtinguiſhed, ſo critical, and ſo productive, impoſe on the mind an obligation to examine and to appreciate their character; and ſince it would argue an extraordinary dullneſs of thought

and feeling not to be able to aſcertain that character, we may venture, without preſumption, to embrace them as unequivocal marks of the Divine approbation of our conſtancy and perſeverance in a cauſe, which now alone maintains and vindicates the ſacred relations ſubſiſting between God and man.

Whether we view the criſis produced by theſe great events according to the rule of worldly prudence, of religious duty, or of both, we muſt be ſenſible that it is incumbent upon us to turn the incalculable advantages that they preſent to the beſt account; and to improve, to the very utmoſt of our power, the ſplendid opportunities that they afford.—It is NOW that we muſt diſcharge this taſk. Time is fugitive and inſecure;—and if we neglect or procraſtinate its uſe, the rapid ſucceſſion of events continually ariſing, will materially impair, if not totally deſtroy, the happy peculiarity of our preſent poſition. PEACE—the *tranquil* and *ſecure* enjoyment of our time, our talents, and our property—which forms the conſtant object of all our active efforts and all our ſecret deſires;—*ſuch a* PEACE depends for *its exiſtence*, upon our wiſe employment of the preſent fortunate conjuncture.

In order to obtain *ſuch a peace*—with *ſecurity* and *tranquillity* in its train—we are NOW to determine upon the meaſure that wiſdom, experience, and duty ſhall preſcribe. If we inquire,—what that

meaſure is?—we ſhall preſently find the anſwer:—*To extinguiſh* THE PRINCIPLE OF THE WAR, muſt diſcover itſelf to all, who are capable of any deep reflection, as the only poſſible method provided in nature, for obtaining the *ſecurity* and *tranquillity* of PEACE. *As long* as THAT PRINCIPLE ſhall continue to ſurvive in power—a principle ſo particularly and rancorouſly hoſtile, not only to the freedom and proſperity of the Britiſh Empire, but to the very exiſtence of the Britiſh Name—*ſo long* peace will be incapable of receiving *ſubſtantial exiſtence*; and will remain a mere watch-word, enabling faction to ſeduce our confidence, while it inſults our underſtandings.

PEACE, therefore, is to be the ſteady object of our ſtruggle at the preſent important moment; but it muſt be ſought for, by vigouroufly extinguiſhing THAT PRINCIPLE that would fain *extinguiſh it*;—and that would ſubſtitute in the place of PEACE, a ſyſtem of general dependence on, and ſubmiſſion to, the arbitration of ONE GREAT PARAMOUNT NATION;—a ſtate, *pacific* indeed, becauſe controlling the independence of every future hoſtile exertion.

And if this *is* the way to peace; as none can doubt who have conſidered it with reaſonable concern; it is plain, that NOW *or* NEVER is the moment to purſue it.—*That power*, which has ſo repeatedly aſſailed and inſulted every character of peace, and

which has hitherto maintained its uſurped ground with ſuch coloſſal firmneſs, has received from our late ſucceſſes ſo radical a concuſſion, as to be compelled to anticipate its own decline.—Its foundations are diſturbed—its ſolidity is impaired —it feels a principle of infirmity and decay growing within its ſyſtem —it perceives that in its intoxication it has miſcalculated its own puiſſance and our debility ;—it has at laſt received the ſevere and ſecret warnings of that monitor, which firſt convinces tyrants of their crimes, and then haunts them with the expectation of their deſtiny.

In this condition of the *principle of the war*, what are the ſuggeſtions of WISDOM?—I conceive her ſuggeſtions to be, as uſual, ſhort and plain—namely ; that it will be a work of infinitely leſs difficulty for us NOW to extinguiſh it entirely, than it has hitherto proved to reduce it during the ſtruggle to its preſent declining condition :—whereas if, while it is now in our power to extinguiſh it, we fail to do ſo, but leave that principle capable of reviving, we ſhall entail upon ourſelves the neceſſity of recommencing the whole diſpute at a future, and not very remote, day ; without a ray of reaſonable hope, that ſuch another favourable moment will ever again be indulged to us.

Such, then, is the actual ſtate of the war :—that our artful and inſidious enemy is brought to

the verge of his fall, and that he already betrays a bitter conſciouſneſs of this *reverſe in his fortunes*. And it will be for the world and for poſterity to ſee and record, *which* of the two contending parties ſhall turn the criſis to the beſt account—*which* ſhall extricate himſelf from the difficulties of the conteſt, with the greateſt ſkill, wiſdom, and ingenuity.

The notorious craft and meanneſs of the ſpirit now governing in France; its equal aptneſs to counterfeit moderation or to unmaſk its ferocity—to fawn before the power which it fears to aſſail, or to inſult over that which it expects to ſubdue;—theſe qualities render it an object of no ſmall anxiety, to all thoſe who conſider deeply the intereſts of England, to form a reaſonable conjecture, *how* the Directory of France will probably ſhape its conduct, under its preſent reverſe, towards the fair and generous character of the Britiſh people?—and what advantages that unbluſhing fraudulence may not find the means of deriving from a nation, prone to peace and proſperous induſtry—and unacquainted with the exceſſes and infinite combinations of artifice and falſhood.

In this contemplation, the moſt probable event which can ſuggeſt itſelf, is, that ſuch an enemy, ſo circumſtanced, will not be backward to offer to us a ſeparate negociation for peace;—thus *ſuing*, as it were, for his own reſtoration to an eminence, from

which he feels himſelf manifeſtly declining. We have already had complete experience of the *real* diſpoſition of this enemy in reſpect of peace, when fairly tendered by Great Britain; we cannot therefore be at a loſs to judge of the principle of any negociation extorted from it by the ſenſe of declining power; and propoſed, only in order to the recovery of that power, by checking the progreſs of its decline. Nor can we avoid perceiving, after a review of the late negociations, and of the evils we have eſcaped through their failure, that compliance with any ſuch *partial* overture, can be nothing leſs than conſenting to the degradation of Great Britain, and at the ſame time to the renunciation of all the benefits now diſpoſed within our reach, by foregoing the moment which might rivet them in our poſſeſſion. Such a negociation could produce but *one great and certain effect*; that, namely, of laying by in ſtore the ſeeds of the preſent diſorder; and of furniſhing the principle of the war with the time and means for recruiting its vigour; ſo as to recover at length its former aſcendancy, and produce at a future day the repetition of all the horrible convulſions, which now agonize Chriſtendom. With ſuch an enemy, whoſe principle is *eſſential hoſtility*, no terms of compromiſe can be ſafe from ruin;—nor is it poſſible that *any Negociation*, which does not tend abſolutely to *incapacitate* that principle, by being made *General*, and by uniting into *equal*

action the influence of *every European power*, can operate in any degree to produce the iſſue of real and ſecure pacification to Europe.

Plain, however, as this reaſoning ſhould ſeem to all who have taken a juſt and diſpaſſionate eſtimate of the French uſurpation, and of its inevitable relations to the intereſts of this country; yet, ſuch is the variety of the human judgment—ſo oppoſitely do different individuals conclude from the ſame event--that there will doubtleſs be ſome who will diſſent from what has been here contended; ſo that, ſhould ſuch a ſtep be finally adopted by the French Directory, we may reaſonably ſuppoſe that there will not be wanting perſons at home, who will at all events ſtrenouſly adviſe an amicable compliance with the overture; and who will urge it before the public with all the ingenuity and recommendation of argument, in which eloquence is able to inveſt it.

But this is not all;—we may further be reaſonably prepared to expect, that the ſame perſons who could think thus favourably of a pacific challenge ſent from the Directory, may not wait for the arrival of overtures from France; but, ſhutting their eyes, under the prejudice of opinion, upon all the experience derived to the nation from the two laſt negociations; and overlooking the goading indignities we then ſuſtained; may paint in brilliant colours the advantageous ground we have *now*

acquired, and may urgently adviſe our attempting a *third* negociation, as one in which we *muſt* ſtand ſuperior to the inſolence of France, and from which we cannot fail to return with very conſiderable emolument.—In either event, whether they ſhould *adviſe* the opening an overture from this country —or ſhould only *adviſe* compliance with one offered by France, we ſtill know WHO the politicians *muſt be*, whoſe opinions could favour ſuch a ſyſtem of pacification; recommending it upon *their own* JUDGMENTS, as tending by the moſt direct proceſs to the *extinction of war*, and to the confirmation of a *ſecure* and *laſting peace*.

The parties, with whoſe opinions theſe modes of proceeding would beſt accord, we can have no difficulty in tracing out; ſince they themſelves have taken particular care to enable us to do ſo, by the principles which they have elaborately and unequivocally expoſed before the public during the conduct of the war, and more eſpecially during the two late attempts to open a negociation for peace with the Directory of France. They are, thoſe perſons, or a part of them,* who have acted in

* It is ardently to be wiſhed, that the wiſe and manly ſentiments delivered by Major General Tarleton, in his remarks on Sir John Sinclair's ſolitary oppoſition to Mr. Pitt's motion reſpecting the naval ſervice of the enſuing year, may be a teſtimony of a ſettled determination to give *full effect* to the meaſure therein propoſed; and that that meaſure will not be

avowed and ſyſtematical oppoſition to the meaſures of the Britiſh Government, during the whole progreſs of the preſent war.

But ſince EXPERIENCE is the teſt by which all reaſonable men are to determine their opinions, it will be juſt and natural for US alſo to conſult *our experience*, upon a matter of ſuch extreme importance, in order to inform ourſelves thoroughly concerning the qualifications of thoſe politicians for raiſing confidence, either in *counſelling the crown*, or *perſuading their countrymen*, concerning the PUBLIC SAFETY;—concerning the cauſes which may endanger it, or thoſe which may confirm its ſecurity. For I have always been of the opinion, and I have as yet met with no reaſon ſufficient to move me from that opinion, that the public meaſures, and the avowed principles, of the *Oppoſition*, are as fairly open to examination and calculation as thoſe of the *Adminiſtration*;—that is to ſay, of thoſe who are candidates for official ſituations, as of thoſe who actually poſſeſs them—of thoſe who wiſh to *get in* to office, as of thoſe who deſire to *remain in*.

impeded in its progreſs to ſucceſs by any attempt to ſeparate Great Britain from her allies; or, by any facility afforded to the French Uſurpation to recover from the blow it has received, by the diſcovery of an haſty and imbecile diſpoſition on the part of Great Britain to treat for a *nominal peace*.

To concentrate our view, and to avoid diſtraction in the inquiry, let us take *one teſt*; which, being in itſelf complete, may render it unneceſſary to have recourſe to any other.—Let us, then, look back to the fruitful *experience* of the preſent year—and turn our thoughts, with grave and ſerious attention, to the ever-memorable tranſactions at MAIDSTONE;—to the cordial and emphatic teſtimony, given *upon oath*, to the loyalty and fidelity of ARTHUR O'CONNOR;—to his allegiance to the Sovereign—to his attachment to the principles which placed his illuſtrious family on the throne—and to his abhorrence of any conſpiration with a foreign enemy, for the invaſion of theſe kingdoms, and the ſubverſion of this Government.—When we ſhall have ſufficiently impreſſed our minds with the ſpirit of this moſt ſolemn evidence, let us next tranſport our thoughts to DUBLIN, and contraſt our impreſſions with the formal and preciſe declaration and aſſeveration of the ſame O'CONNOR, delivered alſo *upon oath*, only a few weeks after the former evidence;—in which he expreſly and diſtinctly makes confeſſion of his diſloyalty and treaſon—avows his determined enmity to the eſtabliſhed conſtitution of the kingdom,—and lays open the deep engagements of conſpiracy in which he was implicated with our inveterate enemy, for the introduction of a foreign invader, for effecting the diſſolution of the Britiſh Monarchy, and ſeparat-

ing Ireland from the crown of Great Britain.—With *this guide* (ſuch an one as perhaps was never before afforded to a nation, to conduct its public opinion through the intricacies of contending politics,) let us proceed to make our eſtimate of the *judgment* of thoſe perſons concerning the PUBLIC SAFETY;—whoſe ſentiments, at the ſame time, betray a conſtant bias and inclination to meet half-way the friendſhip of the Directorial Government.

In making this alluſion to the *evidence at Maidſtone*, and contraſting it with the *confeſſion at Dublin*, I poſitively diſclaim all intention whatever of arraigning or outraging the INTEGRITY of the parties concerned on the former occaſion;—their integrity remains abſolutely unviolated by the preſent argument;—but their JUDGMENT, (that only other alternative)—that quality which can alone give them a title to offer counſel or opinion concerning the public *ſafety* of the country, and the *beſt* means of defending it,—that quality is here moſt deeply committed. Indeed, it is proved here to be ſo fallacious, of ſuch uncertain operation, and capable of ſuch groſs impoſition, as to repel confidence, by being wanting in the qualities which properly attract it. Had not they in whoſe hands the public power of the ſtate was happily veſted, poſſeſſed a *longer-ſight*—had they not been ſuſceptible of an *early* conviction that Ireland was ready to

explode with treaſon, that kingdom would have been irrecoverably loſt. But, fortunately for Great Britain, they took a different and more comprehenſive view of the affairs of Ireland, than thoſe perſons whoſe confidence Mr. O'CONNOR was ſo ſucceſsful in ſeducing; and did not wait to receive their *firſt* perſuaſion of a *projected* conflagration, from the *ſucceſsful exploſion of the* FLAMES. *

* The following paſſage in a letter from Cicero to Brutus is too obviouſly and remarkably applicable to the preſent ſubject, to be withheld from the reader. It will be ſufficient merely to preſent it; without attempting to offer him any aſſiſtance, either to diſcern its wiſdom, or to trace out the correſpondence which has cauſed it to be introduced here.

" *Omnia, Brute, præſtiti reipublicæ, quæ præſtare debuit is, qui eſſet in eo in quo* EGO *ſum gradu,* SENATUS POPULIQUE JUDICIO CONLOCATUS: *nec illa modò, quæ nimirum ſola ab homine ſunt poſtulanda, fidem, vigilantiam, patriæ charitatem: ea ſunt enim, quæ nemo eſt qui non præſtare debeat. Ego autem ei, qui ſententiam dicat* IN PRINCIPIBUS *de republicâ, puto etiam* PRUDENTIAM *eſſe præſtandam. Nec me, cum mihi tantum ſumpſerim ut gubernacula reipublicæ prenderem, minus putarim reprehendendum, ſi inutiliter aliquid ſenatui ſuaſerim, quam ſi* INFIDELITER."—Cic. Ed. Elz. vol. ii. p. 565.

" I have rendered to the ſtate, Brutus, all that ought to be rendered by one who occupies that high ſtation, in which I am now placed, by the voice of the Senate and the people.—Not merely thoſe things which are to be demanded from every man;—fidelity—vigilance—and a love for my county;—for theſe are qualities which can be diſpenſed with in no man;—

Many, I believe, *now* candidly declare, that they were deceived in reſpect of affairs in Ireland; —ſome begin alſo to confeſs, that their eyes are *now* open in reſpect of the character of the French ſyſtem;—but this candour works no retroſpective improvement of their judgment; ſince it is at beſt the avowal of a *tardy diſcernment*, which is perſuaded, after a lapſe of time, of that, which the great majority was convinced of long before.

Since therefore, ſuch perſons, however uprightly and honourably they may *intend*, can have no ſuperior claim as *authorities* to our confidence and ſubmiſſion, either in eſtimating the actual ſituation of the country, or in pointing out the means by which the ſecurity of peace can be beſt attained; and ſince the intereſts we have at riſk in the iſſue of the war are infinitely too valuable to be ſacrificed either to compliment or experiment; let us have recourſe to the exerciſe of thoſe principles of fair and lucid wiſdom, by the aid of which the nation has been already extricated from ſo many dan-

But I have ever been of opinion, that he, who takes upon himſelf to give counſel in the Senate concerning the public affairs, is bound to accompany that counſel with WISDOM.—When I adventured ſo far as to take upon myſelf the arduous office of guiding the helm of the ſtate, I accounted myſelf to be no leſs open to juſt reprehenſion, if that which I recommended in the Senate was deſtitute of *utility*, as if it was devoid of INTEGRITY."

gers, and has been piloted into that ſtation of complete repoſe, in which it now braves the furious but ineffectual menaces of the ſurrounding ſtorms.

Theſe principles will plainly diſcover to us, that *ſecure peace* is diſpoſed now *within our power*, provided we will purſue her vigorouſly through the *natural ſequel* of the preſent war;—a war, whoſe aſpect and circumſtances, under the conduct of Providence, have now recently become ſo cheering and propitious.

We could not give a more manifeſt proof how ill we deſerve the bleſſing of this great change, than by betraying a backwardneſs or reluctance to make the ſacrifices neceſſary, for ſecuring and appropriating the benefits with which it teems. But the ſenſe of our dependence on Providence —of the certainty of His ſupport—and the excellence of our cauſe,—will make us ſenſible of the abject wickedneſs of withdrawing ourſelves now from the conteſt, merely becauſe we may feel it inconvenient; and will teach us, that, comparing our ſtate of eminent proſperity and unimpaired ſecurity with the hurricanes which diſtantly ſweep round us, it behoves us to preſs forward in the conflict—to animate our hopes and courage, by ſetting before our minds the ſignal deliverances we have experienced,—and to make every effort that can be aſſigned to us, for extricating the world from its preſent

dilemma, and finally extinguiſhing that raging ſpirit of IMPIOUS DISORDER, whoſe action operates againſt every beſt intereſt of man: whether it be the intereſt of ſocial ſecurity in reſpect of this preſent life, or of pious conſolation in reſpect of that which is to follow.

Many are the conſiderations, ariſing from *policy*, which come to the ſupport of *duty*, in her exhortations to make thoſe efforts that the nature of the preſent occaſion renders indiſpenſable.—The meaſure, propoſed by them who have conducted us hitherto ſo ſafely through the troubles brought by France upon Europe, bears marks of the ſoundeſt policy; it is ſimply this, that, inſtead of borrowing money for the public, to diſadvantage, in order to defray the neceſſary expenſes of the enſuing year, and then burthening the public with a permanent intereſt to anſwer the engagements of that great increaſe of debt; only *a part* of the money required for the yearly ſervice ſhall be raiſed by the proceſs of a loan, and *the remainder* be levied in a clear ſum, aſſeſſed by an equitable ſcale on the income of individuals; which latter project, as it will will not add a ſhilling of increaſe to the debt, ſo it will not entail any engagement of intereſt. And, although the levy of ſuch a ſum muſt neceſſarily, for the preſent, preſs ſomewhat heavier upon each, yet that burthen will be immediate and tran-

ſient, inſtead of continually recurring and permanent. If now ſuch a ſyſtem can be rendered *perfectly effectual*; if the nation will *cheerfully* and *fairly* come forward and meet the endeavours of the Miniſter, with a vigour of determination, and an integrity of dealing, ſuited to the magnitude of the occaſion, and will co-operate in giving it effect; we ſhall then have obtained the means of putting in full force our ſtupendous reſources, and ſhall have demonſtrated to the enemy the perfect vanity of any hoſtile ſyſtem, founded upon an hope of exhauſting them.

The vigorous ſtate of our public credit—the high value of our funds—and the unexampled proſperity of our commerce, which has uniformly increaſed in proportion to the prolongation of the war:* —theſe are lofty conſiderations, ſufficient to determine us to proſecute cheerfully a conteſt, which impairs ſo little the vital ſprings of the empire; eſpecially, when we find the ſcale turning with

* It will be, indeed, a ſtroke of maſterly policy, ſhould what is ſtated in the public prints prove to be correct, concerning the terms on which we have evacuated St. Domingo.—If in renouncing that deſtructive territory, whoſe only value to Great Britain was its amity and commerce, his Majeſty's Miniſters have ſucceeded in detaching it from France, and have ſecured its trade to this country, they will have taken the moſt effectual means to repair the loſſes which the tranſactions of that colony have hitherto cauſed us to ſuſtain; and will be juſtly entitled to the applauſe of the public.

ſuch deciſion in our favour ; and when we perceive, that a perſeverance in exertion on our part, comparatively ſhort, muſt compel the conteſt to an happy and honourable iſſue. Theſe facts, joined to a conſideration of the energy increaſing in the different powers in Europe, who had either been violently ſeparated from our alliance—or who had deſerted it through a miſtaken policy —or who had ſlunk into a neutral lethargy from the commencement of the war—may convince us of the value of the preſent effort : And we may further add to theſe reflections, a foreſight of the prodigious enlargement of our means of commerce, by the annihilation of the French power in the Mediterranean, and of their trade and intereſt in the Levant. Not forgetting to embrace within our view, the proſpective hopes of finally breaking aſunder the ancient union between France and the Ottoman Porte ; and, perhaps, of eſtabliſhing in its place ſuch commercial relations between the latter power and Great Britain, eſpecially in reſpect of her Eaſt Indian dependencies, where France had plotted her deſtruction, as ſhall inſpire new vigour into that quarter of her trade; while, at the ſame time, it ſhall impreſs the Porte with the conviction, of the preferable connexion of this country.

The heroic exertions of our great natural ally, the Emperor of Ruſſia, whoſe fleets and valiant armies

are juſt now entered on the theatre of war,—the vigorous concurrence of the Turk, whom the monſtrous ſyſtem of France has compelled into cordial alliance with her ancient adverſary—the congenial ſpirit breaking forth among our brethren in America, and tending to efface every hoſtile veſtige, while it repairs the ancient bonds of brotherhood—the activity diſcovering itſelf at Naples, at Vienna, and even at Berlin, in conſequence of the relief afforded to Europe by the great VICTORY OF THE NILE—the foreſight of its ultimate effect upon Spain,—on the kingdoms of the Baltic—on the oppreſſed and haraſſed inhabitants of the Netherlands—and on that moſt injured race, the brave but perſecuted and truly wretched natives of Switzerland :—theſe ſurely are conſiderations powerful enough to call forth all our manhood—to rouſe our virtue, to provoke our honour, to animate our hopes in the great cauſe, —and to induce us to reſolve, not to ſuſtain the irreparable loſs that would accrue, ſhould we ſuffer the political machine, now ſo highly wound up, to run down without effect ; or allow the exalted and univerſal ſpirit of patriotiſm to evaporate, without availing ourſelves of all its preſent energies.

We cannot be ſo blind as not to diſcern, that a poſitive turn has taken place in the fortunes of the French uſurpation. It is only by *following up the blow*, that we can hope to annihilate it :—

and, if it is *not annihilated*, it will recover under a peace to all that *dimenſion of miſchief*, which has enabled it ſo long to be the arbitreſs of the tranquillity or diſquiet of Chriſtendom.—We muſt not be ſo heedleſs as to forget, that at *all times* the *centrical* poſition of France *alone*, by means of which ſhe is able to put in motion her powerful armies towards every part of the Continent—whilſt her prodigious extent of ſea coaſt, and her maritime opportunities, are ſufficient to keep alive the whole jealouſy of the navy of Great Britain—that this *centrical poſition alone*, (which ſhe muſt ever *excluſively* poſſeſs) more than *doubles* the importance of *every point* of her territory.—That, to extend to the moſt tyrannical exceſs theſe ſuperior advantages of poſition, forms *preciſely* the policy of the preſent ſyſtem in France; and that, to circumſcribe thoſe unequal advantages within a proportion conſiſtent with the general and laſting peace of Europe, forms *preciſely* the policy of Great Britain and her allies in ſtrenuouſly proſecuting the conteſt.—It is NOW *or* NEVER, therefore, that we muſt puſh forward for the ſeparation of Flanders from the uſurpation of France; by poſſeſſing which, her dominion extends from the Tyber to the Elbe;—the entire weſtern coaſt of Europe preſents a line of *French frontier* between Great Britain and the other powers of the continent—and, while the body of France broods in her ancient ſeat, her monſtrous wings,

ſpread over Spain and Holland, extend almost from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. While this continues, the balance of Europe, (that balance which determines all its peace,) is overſet by the enormous preponderance of France. But the preſent period promiſes to afford an opportunity of eventually wreſting Flanders from the gripe of France, and perhaps of again obtaining its inſertion into the trunk of ſome great and principal power, who may thus ſtand forward—with an arm continually extended—between France and Holland; ſkreening Holland from the influence of France, and covering the North of Europe from French aggreſſion;—and who may preſent a point of contact to Great Britain, enabling her to maintain that intercourſe with the interior powers of Europe, which France labours ſo earneſtly and anxiouſly to deſtroy. For, the *true* political importance of Flanders in reſpect of Europe has *hitherto* been, neither its ſoil nor its population; but, that connexion with the Houſe of Auſtria, which has rendered it *a theatre* upon which the *whole force* of that powerful and illuſtrious Houſe might occaſionally *be transferred*; thus oppoſing to France a formidable barrier on the North: and offering a degree of reſiſtance, infinitely beyond any that Flanders, moulded into a petty ſtate nominally independent, can ever be able to produce.

It is Now, *or* NEVER, that we are to ſeek the accompliſhment of all THESE GREAT ENDS:—it is Now, *or* NEVER, that we are to prevent the *principle of the French Uſurpation* from taking a permanent root in Europe, and at the ſame time to render permanent the fair benefits derivable from our own diſtinguiſhed ſucceſſes :—it is Now, *or* NEVER, the time—by means of a lofty policy, and a brave and virtuous determination to encounter every difficulty, and to ſubmit to every ſacrifice, that duty can impoſe—to accompliſh the extinction of a cauſe which acts with implacable enmity againſt every ancient intereſt of Chriſtendom; and by means of a PEACE—*meriting the name of* PEACE, —to eſtabliſh, with God's aſſiſtance, on a ſecure and inconcuſſible foundation, the civil and religious liberties of the world.

THE END.